Abstract Role-Based Encryption (RBE) realizes access control mechanisms over encrypted data according to the widely adopted hierarchical RBAC model. In this paper, we present a practical RBE scheme with revocation mechanism based on partial-order key hierarchy with respect to the public key infrastructure, in which each user is assigned with a unique private-key to support user identification, and each role corresponds to a public group-key that is used to encrypt data. Based on this key hierarchy structure, our RBE scheme allows a sender to directly specify a role for encrypting data, which can be decrypted by all senior roles, as well as to revoke any subgroup of users and roles. We give a full proof of security of our scheme against hierarchical collusion attacks. In contrast to the existing solutions for encrypted file systems, our scheme not only supports dynamic joining and revoking users, but also has shorter ciphertexts and constant-size decryption keys.
Introduction
Role-based access control (RBAC), as a proven alternative to traditional access controls, including discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC), has been widely adopted in various information systems over the past few years [1] . Even though RBAC can tremendously help us minimize the complexity in administering users, it is still inevitable to adopt various cryptographic capabilities of managing resources in RBAC systems [2] , so as to protect the resources that deviate from the access control system. However, the existing cryptographic schemes based on common asymmetric cryptosystem have several limitations to address above-mentioned features since those schemes cannot accommodate access control features of RBAC and lack scalability and interoperability for enterprise application environments with a large number of users [3] . Role-Based Cryptosystem, proposed by Zhu et al. [4] , is a key management system that realizes encryption, signature and authentication according to role hierarchy (RH) in RBAC model. As an important part of role-based cryptosystem, Role-Based Encryption (RBE) enables an access control mechanism over encrypted data by hiding access permissions and assigned roles into private keys and ciphertexts. One of the advantages of RBE is the ability to easily link up with the existing RBAC models and systems. In an RBE system, a resource owner specifies an access permission, which could be a security clearance (SC) requirement, to encrypt the resource directly by encryption algorithm (which can be run by anyone knowing the universal public key issued by an authority). Each user in this system possesses a unique private key associated with a role, stating the identity and privilege level within the organization. Such a user can decrypt a ciphertext if the user's privilege level is equal to or higher than the clearance requirement associated with the ciphertext. Different from traditional cryptosystems, a key feature of RBE is that the encryption algorithm is not for individual user, but for the group of authorized users.
Role hierarchy is a natural means of structuring roles to reflect an organization's lines of authority and responsibility. In RBAC model, role hierarchy defines an inheritance relationship among roles, which is required to be a partial order. As role hierarchy is the foundation of RBAC, it is necessary to implement such a mechanism in the construction of RBE. It requires us not only to hide the information of RH into public encryption keys and user's keys, but also to find an efficient cryptographical method to validate the partial ordering relation among these keys. Moreover, it is necessary for practical applications to ensure shorter length of user's key, as well as to support a large number of users.
Related Work
The research on cryptographic hierarchical structures has a long history since hierarchical structure is a natural way to organize and manage a large number of users. Several approaches on cryptographic partial order relation supporting hierarchical structures have been proposed. Akl and Taylor introduced a simple scheme to solve multilevel security problem [5] [6] . Since then, several efficient methods have been studied. The concept of logical key hierarchy (LKH) was proposed by Wallner et al. [7] and Wong et al. [8] independently. In this paradigm, common encryption key was organized into a tree structure to achieve secure group communication in a multicast environment. Several modifications have been proposed, such as complete subtree (CS) [9] , subset difference (SD) [10] , and layered subset difference (LSD) [11] . All of these schemes are constructed in symmetric-key setting, and the lengths of ciphertext and user's key are directly associated with the number of users.
Public-key hierarchical cryptosystems have been recently proposed, e.g., Boneh and Franklin proposed the first fully functional identity-based encryption scheme (IBE) [12] [13] in 2001, in which the public key can be an arbitrary string such as an email address. In order to manage a large number of users, hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) mirrors an organizational hierarchy [14] . Another important area is hierarchy key management (HKM) that also organizes the key into a hierarchy. For example, time-bound hierarchical key assignment (THKA) [15] can assign time-dependent encryption keys to a set of classes in a partially ordered hierarchy. This scheme is especially suitable for the realtime broadcast system with time control. Since all users with the same role share the same key, these schemes are hard to realize certain useful security mechanisms, such as revocation, digital forensics, and traceability.
Since Sahai and Waters [16] introduced attribute-based encryption (ABE) as a new means of encrypted access control in 2005, ABE has received much attention and many schemes have been proposed recently, such as, key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [17] [18] [19] , ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [20] [21] [22] [23] and dual policy ABE (DP-ABE) [24] [25] . ABE is based on the attributebased access control (ABAC) [26] [27] or fine grained access control (FGAC) [28] [29] model. In an ABE system, ciphertexts are not necessarily encrypted to one particular user by an assigned key as in traditional public key cryptography. Instead, both users' private keys and ciphertexts will be associated with a set of attributes or a policy over attributes. A user is able to decrypt a ciphertext if there is a "match" between his private key and the ciphertext. Although it takes time to widely adopt ABAC or FGAC model in practical management information systems (MIS), it is worth learning the features of access policy representation in ABE. At the same time, the research on attribute-based signature has also made great progress and various attributebased signature schemes [30] [31] [32] have been proposed. There are several recent studies of revocation mechanism of ABE. For example, Attrapadung and Imai [33] presented a revocation approach for a subset of at most t users based on Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) with random polynomial of degree t. This approach also leads to a longer size of public-key, which is direct proportional to the number of revoked users t. Thus, it is not an effective solution to practical applications, especially to supporting a large number of users.
To overcome the limitations of the exiting solutions, we presented a practical cryptographic RBAC model in [4] , called role-key hierarchy model, to support various security features based on role-key hierarchy. In that work, we introduced a role-based cryptosystem construction, which includes a role-based encryption (RBE) scheme and a role-based signature (RBS) scheme. With the help of role-key hierarchy, this RBE scheme can be tightly integrated into the hierarchical RBAC systems. However, this RBE scheme could not support the revocations of users and roles. Thus, efficient revocation mechanism should be introduced to improve the existing RBE scheme.
Contributions
In this paper, we focus on the construction of a cryptosystem compatible with hierarchical RBAC model. With the help of bilinear pairings, we present an enhanced Role-Based Encryption with revocation mechanism. Our new scheme provides more flexible control than other schemes, as well as an efficient revocation mechanism to support any number of users (or identities) and roles. Furthermore, our scheme has following [20] Access Model RBAC ABAC [26] [27] and FGAC [28] [29] new properties: key hierarchy can support arbitrary partial-order structures and an unlimited number of roles; a manager can dynamically add infinitely many users without revising the existing ciphertexts and user's private keys; and encryption is collusion-secure for arbitrarily large collusion of users. Moreover, our construction also achieves an optimal bound of overhead rate for both ciphertexts and decryption keys. Most importantly, our RBE scheme has better performance and scalability than existing solutions for encrypted file systems (EFS).
To explain the features of RBE, in Table 1 we show the main differences between RBE and ABE in comparison with BSW's CP-ABE [20] . For example, our RBE scheme has a user's private key with constant size rather than variable size; the RBE encryption is automatically performed by RBAC systems, which serve to reduce the burdens of regulation on managements; there exists an efficient revocation method for a subset of users; and so on.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews some basic notions and complexity assumptions. Section 3 articulates the definition of RBE and security models. In Section 4, we address our RBE construction. We evaluate the security and performance of our schemes in Sections 5 and Section 6, respectively. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 7.
Preliminaries
In this section, we present a brief description of partial order relation and role hierarchy in RBAC model. Next, we briefly review the necessary facts about bilinear maps, as well as a class of assumptions used in our RBE scheme.
Partial Order Relation and Role Hierarchy
Let Ψ = P, be a (finite) partially ordered set (Poset) with partial order relation on a (finite) set P . A partial order is a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation. We provide some terminology for partial order relation. Two distinct elements x and y in Ψ are said to be comparable if x y or y x. Otherwise, they are incomparable, denoted by x y. An order relation on P gives rise to a relation ≺ of strict partial order: x ≺ y in P iff x y and x = y. We define the predecessors and successors of elements in Ψ = P, as follows: for an element x in P , ↑ x = {y ∈ P : x y} denotes the set of predecessors of x, ↓x = {y ∈ P : y x} denotes the set of successors. Two posets are said to be isomorphic if their "structures" are entirely identical. Formally, posets Ψ = P, and Φ = Q, are isomorphic if there exists a bijection f from P to Q such that x y iff f (x) f (y).
In hierarchical RBAC model, inheritance is reflexive because a role inherits its own permissions, and transitivity is a natural requirement in this context. Also, anti-symmetry rules out roles that inherit from one another and would therefore be redundant. For example, we can represent Ψ = P, by using circles (indicating the elements of P ) and inter-connecting lines (indicating the covering relations). For example, Fig.1(a) shows the diagrams for some simple ordered sets. Sub-figures (a1), (a2) and (a3) are linear, tree, and inverted-tree structure, respectively. Sub-figure (a4) is a three-layer tree structure, in which the senior r a (top) inherits the permissions from all other juniors (bottom). Especially, there exist two different paths {r f , r b , r a } and {r f , r c , r a } from r f to r a . Sub-figure (a5) is a threelayer hybrid structure, which is composed of various different structures. Note that r a and râ are not related through hierarchy.
Generally, a hierarchy in RBAC is mathematically a partial order that defines an inheritance (or seniority) relation between roles, whereby senior roles acquire the permissions from their juniors. An example of role hierarchy is shown in Fig.1(b) , in which more powerful (senior) roles are shown toward the top of the diagram and less powerful (junior) roles toward the bottom. Based on this, we present the definition of role hierarchy as follows.
Definition 1 (Role Hierarchy). Given a set of users U , a role hierarchy H is a triple U, R, , if there exists a (finite) partially ordered set R, , such that each user belongs to and only belongs to a role, i.e., for all
u i,j ∈ U , there exists an r i ∈ R, such that u i,j ∈ r i .
Bilinear Maps and Some Assumptions
Let G 1 and G 2 be two additive groups and G T be a multiplicative group with large prime order p.
A computable bilinear map is a function e : G 1 ×G 2 → G T with the following properties: for any
Security of our system is based on a complexity assumption called the General Decisional bilinear DiffieHellman Exponent (GDDHE) assumption. We define the GDDHE problem as follows.
and
We refer to Theorem A.2 as a proof that GDDHE has generic security when h ∈ (F 1 , F 2 , F 3 ) in [34] . In Lemma 1, we restate the generic security in a more concrete form for (n, t)-GDDHE 1 problem [34] [35] . Definition 3 ((n, t)-GDDHE 1 Problem). Let f (x) and g(x) be two known random polynomials of degree t and n − t with pairwise distinct roots respectively,
be a two-variable polynomial, and
We require that no efficient isomorphism
Definitions
In this section, we begin by formally defining what is a role-based encryption system. We then state the security requirements and adversary's attack models needed for our proof of security. For the sake of clarity, we list some notations used throughout this paper in Table 2 . 
Public-Key Role-Based Encryption
Given a role hierarchy H = U, R, , a publickey Role-Based Encryption (RBE) is specified by five polynomial-time algorithms S, G, A, E, D .
1) Setup(κ, H) → (mk , par ). Take a security parameter κ and a role hierarchy H as input. It produces a manager key mk and a public parameter par.
2) GenRKey(par , r i ) → pk i . Take the parameter par and a role index r i . It generates a public encryption key pk i of r i .
3
. Take a user identity ID, a user index u i,j in the role r i , and the manager key mk. It outputs a user's secret key, which involves a private key dk i,j , a user label lab i,j , and par = par {lab i,j }.
Take as input the encryption key pk i , a message M and a set of revoked users R ⊆ U . It returns a ciphertext
Take as input a ciphertext C i , a subset R ⊆ H and a user decryption key dk i,j . It returns a message M .
We need to realize the user revocation by the user label lab i,j , called identity-based revocation (IBR). With the help of this revocation mechanism, some users {u i,j } ∈ R can be revoked temporarily from the authorized users in ciphertexts. This paper does not highlight the revocation of roles since we can realize this mechanism by using Control Domain addressed in Section 4.
Given an instance of RBE scheme E under a certain H, we define a key hierarchy
, and pk i pk j iff there exists a polynomial-time algorithm F (H, pk i , r j ) = pk j . We call F the derivation (or delegation [36] ) function of E, which is used to realize the partial order relation in a set of public encryption keys.
Note that, we require that a user belongs to a single role rather than to multiple roles in this definition due to the construction limitations in cryptography. Although this requirement is not true in general RBAC model, it is necessary to require strict role-based authentication mechanisms to provide strong security. If necessary the manager can assign multiple secret keys to different roles, but they have the same label. In addition, in practice the RBAC model can automatically employ the user's current role to invoke the Encrypt algorithm.
Security Notions and Adversary's Attack Models
The security requirements of RBE system, made up of three properties, are defined as follows. 
Definition 4 (RBE). Given a role hierarchy H
= U, R, , an RBE scheme E = S, G, A, E, D (|R| = m, |U | = n)i = E(R, pk i , M ), Pr D(R, dk j,l , C i ) = M : ∀u j,l ∈ r j , r i r j ∧ u j,l ∈ R = 1.
3) Security: For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D , every polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large
The principal attack on RBE system is the collusion attack between different users, that is, A corrupts some u j,l ∈ R to decrypt C i , even if u j,l ∈ r j and r i r j . Hence, we define a semantic security under Chosen Plaintext Attack against Hierarchical Collusion (denoted by IND-hcCPA). Security is defined using the following game between an attack algorithm A and a challenger B. This game is defined as follows. The above game models an attack where all users, who are not in the set R, collude to try and expose a ciphertext intended for users in U \ R only. The set R is chosen by the adversary. In this game, we define the advantage of the adversary A in attacking the scheme as
where |R| = t, |R| = m, |U | = n, and the probability is taken over the random coins of A and all probabilistic algorithms in the scheme. 
Our Construction
In this section, we describe a public-key RBE scheme with role hierarchy, which has new features including O(m)-size ciphertexts and encryption key, as well as O(1)-size decryption key for the number of roles m. This construction also supports the revocation of any number of users.
Role-Based Encryption Scheme
Let H = {U, R, } be a role-key hierarchy. Without loss of generality, we assume that the total number of roles is m in H, i.e., R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m }. We construct an RBE scheme as follows. S = (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e) be a bilinear map group system with randomly selected generators G ∈ G 1 and H ∈ G 2 respectively, where G 1 , G 2 are two bilinear groups of prime order p, |p| = O(κ). This algorithm first picks a random integer τ i ∈ Z * p for each r i in role-key hierarchy graph. We define 2) GenRKey(par , r i ). This is an assignment algorithm for role key from the public parameter par. For a role r i , the role key pk i can be computed as
1) Setup(κ, Ψ ). Let
where {D k } ∀r k ∈↑ri is the identity set of all roles in ↑ r i .
It is clear that
3) AddUser(mk , ID, r i , u i,j ). Given the manager key mk = G, {τ i } m i=0 and a user index u i,j in the role r i , the manager generates a unique decryption key by randomly selecting a fresh x i,j = Hash(ID, u i,j ) ∈ Z * p and defining a public user label lab i,j = x i,j , V i,j , B i,j and a decryption key dk i,j = A i,j , where
Note that, the total number of users is unlimited in each role. 4) Encrypt(R, pk i , M ). To encrypt the message M ∈ G T , given any pk i = H, V, W i , {D k } r k ∈↑ri and a set of revoked users R = {u i1,j1 , . . . , u it,jt }, the algorithm randomly picks ξ ∈ Z * p and then computes
where,m is the number of elements in C 4 , |R| = t, and
B R and V R can be efficiently computed by the aggregate algorithms from
.1). Finally, it outputs the ciphertext
Given a ciphertext C i from the role r i , the user u j,k ∈ r j can utilize the following equation to recover M from C i with private key dk j,k = A j,k when r i r j and u j,k ∈ R:
where
The derivation function of public keys, F (pk i , r l ) = pk l for any r i r l , can be defined as
r l . Note that, the part C 4 of C i is called Control Domain of this ciphertext in (2) . We can deal with access control constraints for roles by choosing the appropriate r k ∈↑ r i to insert into C 4 . Furthermore, access control constraints for users can be effectively carried out by using the set of revoked users R. The number of revoked users is unlimited in this scheme. Hence, we can revoke any subgroup of roles and users in terms of these two mechanisms.
Security Analysis

Analysis of Consistency
Since D i is chosen at random, we need to consider the collision probability among the role keys {pk i } ri∈R , i.e., W i = W j for i = j, W i ∈ pk i , and W j ∈ pk j . The following theorem tells us that this collision probability is negligible if the security parameter κ is large enough. Theorem 1. The collision probability among m integers chosen from Z * p at random is less than
Proof. Firstly, the collision probability between λ random integers . Hence, with the help of Bernoulli's inequality, the collision proba-
. Note that we do not assume that a i and b j are different.
Since the total number of roles is far less than the size of space of keys, this theorem means that the collision probability is negligible for m p, e.g., given m = 1000 and |p| = 2 × κ = 160 (κ = 80-bits), the collision probability is less than . This implies that different roles almost always have different keys. So we will neglect the collision probability hereinafter.
Theorem 2.
Under the above assignment, 
In terms of the corresponding relation between r i and τ i , we have
This relation implies
and a polynomial-time derivation function F (H, pk i , r j ) = pk j , the relation pk i pk j can be efficiently generated if and only if r i r j in terms of Theorem 2. This gives the consistency between K and H, that is, {pk i pk j } K ∼ {r i r j } H .
Analysis of Correctness
We analyze the validity of our scheme in two cases: R = ∅ and R = ∅ respectively, as follows.
1) In the Case of R = ∅. By the definition of Γ (r j , r i ), we have the equation
r j , as well as
Therefore, the validity of the RBE scheme can be guaranteed by (4) .
2) In the Case of R = ∅. By the definition of x i,j and x i,j , we have
where all x i,j are made public and all x i,j , ζ i , τ i are kept secret. Thus, for a revocation set R = {u i l ,j l , u i k ,j k } and i l = i k , it is easy to obtain
Similarly, B R , B R j,k , and V R can be efficiently computed in an arbitrary revocation set R by a general recursive method, which is defined in Subsection 5.2.1. Therefore, we can prove (3) by (5) .
The revocation mechanism can be supported by (6) , that is, for u i,j ∈ R, B R j,k cannot be computed because the denominator can be zero in a fraction
, where u i ,j ∈ R.
Aggregate Algorithms for User Revocation
It is more important to compute the three values B R , V R , and B R j,k from the labels of public parameter par in an efficient way. We provide such a recursive method (called aggregate algorithm) to solve this problem, as follows.
Given R = {x i1,j1 , . . . , x it,jt } and their la-
it is easy to obtain the equation
To expand this equation to multi-user cases, we define the following denotation B s,r for any pair (s, r), where 1 s < r t,
In the same way, we can compute B s,r = 
where B 0,r is defined as the initial input
Obviously, we can get B R j,k in the same way, or it can be computed from the resulting sequence (B i,j , B 0,1 , B 1,2 , . . . , B t−1,t ) , where
Similarly, we define V s,r = V
Analysis of Security
We prove the semantic security of our RBE scheme under the assumption of the GDDHE 1 problem. Lemma 1 assures that (n, t)-GDDHE 1 problem is hard in the generic bilinear groups.
Lemma 1 (Complexity Lower Bound in Generic Bilinear Groups [34] ). Given an (n, t)-
s and a 1-tuple 2-variate polynomial
, where s = n + t + 4 , then the maximum total degree of these polynomials is
If h is independent of (F 1 , F 2 , F 3 ) then for any algorithm A that makes a total of at mostueries to the oracles computing the group operation in G, G T and the bilinear pairing e(·, ·), we have
.
In terms of this lemma, we can prove that our RBE scheme is semantically secure against dynamic colluders, the number of which is unlimited, as follows.
Theorem 3. The (m, n, t)-RBE is semantically secure against dynamic colluders (IND-hcCPA) assuming the (n, t)-GDDHE 1 problem is hard in S. Concretely, for any probabilistic algorithm A that totalizes at mostueries to the oracles performing group ope-
e(·, ·)) and evaluations of the bilinear map e(·, ·), we have Adv
Proof. We prove this theorem according to the INDhcCPA model as follows: suppose that there exists an adversary A that can break RBE under collusion attack, we build a reduction algorithm B to solve above (n, t)-GDDHE 1 problem in terms of A.
Given S = (p, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e), the algorithm B is given as input an (n, t)-GDDHE 1 instance, which is defined by (1) . In fact, B does not know γ, ς but knows 3n random integers 
In fact, F 1 and F 2 are (n + t + 4)-tuples of 3-variate polynomials and F 3 is 1-tuple 2-variate polynomial, such that, This completes the description of algorithm B. It is easy to describe the advantage of adversary in both instances. To do so, we recall two polynomials
, the challenge ciphertext C i is available since
Hence, we have
Otherwise, we have Pr
Therefore, according to Subsection 2.2, we have
Summing up, we get that Adv
In terms of Lemma 1, it is easy to see that Adv
. This implies the algorithm can decide GDDHE 1 problem with a non-negligible success probability, which would contradict with the assumption. Moreover, we can prove the same result when t = n, that is, full collusion security.
Performance Analysis
Following our terminology, we denote |R| = m and |R| = t. We use E to denote a multiplication operation in G 1 , G 2 or an exponentiation operation in G T , P to denote the pairing operation e :
We analyze the performance of each phase in our scheme as shown in the second column of Table  3 . We neglect the hash operation, the operations in Z p , an addition in G 1 , G 2 and a multiplication in G T , since these operations are much more efficient compared to the pairing operation and exponentiation. Considering the revocation mechanism, our scheme requires
in the encryption algorithm, and (2t + 1)E(G 2 ) is required in the decryption algorithm. This indicates that our scheme has a low computation overhead, related to the number of granted roles and revoked users.
We also present the communication complexity in the third column of Table 3 . This indicates that our scheme has a short constant-size private user key even in large scale systems. Moreover, the size of ciphertext is O(m + t), which is proportional to the number of granted roles and revoked users. Hence, our construction achieves the optimal bound of overhead rate for both ciphertexts and decryption keys. Our scheme can construct an efficient encrypted file systems (EFS) based on RBAC, which enables the users to encrypt files on disks in terms of the user's role(s). Many existing encrypted file systems implement the straight forward encryption system where the number of ciphertexts in the file header grows linearly in the number of users that can access the file. As a result, there is often a hard limit on the number of users that can access a file, and the headers of all files must be changed to permit the user's access when a new user joins the system. For example, the following quote is from Microsoft's knowledge base: "EFS has a limit of 256 KB in the file header for the EFS metadata. This limits the number of individual entries for file sharing that may be added. On average, a maximum of 800 individual users may be added to an encrypted file." [37] We show such a structure in Fig.2(a) .
However, the RBAC systems built on our RBE scheme can automatically use the role key to encrypt the files in terms of the user's role r i in a transparent way for users. Such a file header is shown in Fig.2(b) , in which "Cipher" consists of the constantsize C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ∈ C i , "Granted roles table" consists of C 4 ∈ C i , and "Revoked users table" consists of the list Let R and Z denote T ← R G T and T ← e(G, H) ςf (γ)g(γ) , respectively. It is easy to show that of user's labels in R ∈ C i for an RBE ciphertext C i . Here, both the number of users and the number of revoked users are not limited in this EFS system. Moreover, for a new user who joins this system, all existing files need not be changed to permit the access of these files.
To reduce the length of list of revoked users in file header, our RBE scheme has the capability of fixing the user's labels into the public role key by using the Aggregate algorithms in Subsection 5.2, such that these users will be permanently revoked. Furthermore, as a practical cryptosystem, the keys in RBE system should be regularly renewed by the system manager (such as 3 months or half year). The users who leave the system should be permanently revoked after updating keys. Hence, these mechanisms can avoid the accumulation of revoked users in RBE systems, as well as can reduce the length of R in file headers.
For the sake of clarity, we evaluate the performance of EFS on our RBE scheme as follows: suppose the security parameter κ is 80-bits [38] [39] , we need the elliptic curve domain parameters over Z p with |p| = 160-bits. Elliptic curve domain parameters over Z p with log 2 p = 2κ supply approximately κ bits of security [40] , which means that solving the logarithm problem on associated elliptic curve is believed to take approximately 2 κ operations. This means that the length of the integer is l 0 = 2κ in Z p . Similarly, we have the length of the element in G 1 , G 2 , G T , which satisfy l 1 = 4κ, l 2 = 20κ, and l T = 10κ. We assume that the embedding degree of elliptic curve is 5. In the RBE scheme, the length of the file header is (m+1)·l 1 +1·l 2 +1·l T +t·l = 4κ·(m+1)+20κ+10κ+ 128t = 320m + 128t + 2720 bits, where l is the length of user's label and is set to 128 bits presumed. Considering a system where each role contains 40 users on average, with 800 users and 100 revoked users, the file header is just 320 × 20 + 128 × 100 + 2720 = 21920 bit ≈ 2.68 KB. In contract to the existing EFS structure of Windows NT [41] , this storage cost is far less than 256 KB, which is the exact size of file header of encrypted files in Windows EFS. Furthermore, in RBE-based EFS, the file header with 256 KB can support the system with about 2000 roles, and each role contains 300 users on average and 11 000 revoked users, where the length of the user label is 128 bit. In theory, the above-mentioned system can support unlimited number of users, which is much better than existing EFS.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we introduced a generic role-based encryption over RBAC model to support a flexible encryption of resources in RBAC systems. The proposed scheme supports fully collusion security under a special case of the GDDHE problem and implements the revocation at minimal cost and constant-size ciphertexts and decryption keys. Our scheme has better performance and scalability than existing solutions in encrypted file systems.
In our future work, we will investigate a more comprehensive role-based cryptosystem to support various secure mechanisms, such as encryption, signature, and authentication. Meanwhile, we would exploit the partial ordering relation in ABE with respect to the work addressed in this paper. We will also optimize our solution to improve the performance of revocation algorithms in our scheme. Finally, based on our exiting work, we will propose a complete cryptosystem to realize massive-scale conditional access systems for the practical RBAC applications of large-scale organizations.
